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The objective of this paper is to examine the possible implications of the adjustment of global and intra-
European imbalances, particularly in terms of the macroeconomic impacts. We design a series of 
macroeconomic scenarios and look at the impact of global and European shocks (corresponding to various 
policies aimed at reducing imbalances) on the economies of the biggest world players - the US, China, the oil 
exporting countries, and the EU and its individual members. The methodological approach we adopt is based 
around a series of simulations using the National Institute’s global macroeconomic model NIGEM. Key 
findings suggest that while global imbalances may be adjusted either through policies in the US or in China, 
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Introduction 
 
 
Global imbalances have been at the forefront of macroeconomic research and international 
policy debate for some time. There is consensus that global imbalances and financial crises 
are strongly interrelated (Blanchard, Milesi-Feretti, 2009, Obsfeld, Rogoff, 2009, Claessens 
et al., 2010, Bracke et al., 2008). By many observers and policy makers, global disequilibria 
are also considered to be one of the major factors contributing to the recent crisis (Bernanke, 
2009, Dunaway, 2009, Eichengreen, 2009, Krugman, 2009, Portes, 2009, Barrell et al., 2010, 
King, 2010). While the crisis has led to a reduction in global imbalances, they are now 
widening again, and the rebalancing remains at the core of world macroeconomic policy 
(both at the global and European levels (G20, 2009, G20, 2010, IMF, 2011, EC, 2012)).  
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the possible implications of adjustment to global 
imbalances for the biggest world players – the EU, the US, China, oil exporting countries, 
and with a particular focus on individual members of the EU. We focus on macroeconomic 
impacts.  
 
First, we analyse the pre- and post-crisis trends in the global and European imbalances. We 
identify the main contributors to these processes and look at the potential drivers of 
rebalancing. Next, we design a series of macroeconomic scenarios that allow us to 
quantitatively assess the macroeconomic impacts of unwinding of global and European 
imbalances for the EU and its individual members, as well as the US, China, and the oil 
exporting countries. We look at the results of our simulations from the perspective of policy 
advice concerning growth-enhancing reforms the EU/EA should undertake.  
 
The contribution of this paper is to academic literature and to policy debate. The majority of 
existing studies have looked at global and European imbalances from a historical prospective 
(Borio, Disyatat, 2011, Blanchard, Milesi-Ferretti, 2009, Claessens et al., 2010, Dunaway, 2009, 
Jamotte, Sodsriwiboon, 2010, Barnes, Lawson, Radziwill, 2010). Relatively few have looked 
at potential future implications of the global adjustment (Beaton and et al. (2010), De Mello 
and Padoan (2010), Barrel et al. (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Vogel (2010)) for 
the main world players using global equilibrium models and modelling major regions. Our 
paper adds to this literature. From a policy perspective our paper adds to the debate on 
policies reducing global imbalances and their macroeconomic impacts on individual 
economies (Blanchard, Milesi-Ferretti, 2011, Angeloni et al., 2011). We verify to what extent 
the global adjustment may affect the internal and external imbalances within Europe. We 
study the potential effects of various policies aimed at a reduction of the intra-European 
imbalances. 
 
  
Global and European imbalances 
 
Global imbalances are defined as external positions of major world players that reflect 
distortions or entail risks for the global economy (Bracke et al., 2008).  The main drivers of 
global imbalances can be divided into structural and non-structural factors. The structural 
determinants are relatively sustainable in the medium run and correspond to the medium term 
equilibrium of the economy determined for example by the scale of its financial development 
or the age structure of its population. The equilibrium generated by the structural factors is 
not infinite, but it is sustainable in the medium run. The non-structural factors relate to saving 
and investment patterns in the private and the public sector or policy-induced factors that 
highlight short term risks. The policy aspect behind imbalances is central as it will require a 
correction if the imbalances are to be reduced. 
 
Global imbalances reflect a plethora of macroeconomic and financial factors. While the 
imbalances can emerge naturally, reflecting increased financial integration and a more 
efficient allocation of global savings across countries, in some cases they have reached rather 
unsustainable levels and are often perceived as one of the factors contributing to or preceding 
the recent crisis. The literaturę offers several explanations:  
 
(i) Trends in saving and investment balances (Chinn, Ito, 2008). This approach 
defines the current account balance as the difference between saving and 
investment driven by fiscal and demographic effects.  
 
(ii) According to the global savings glut hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005), there is a 
distortion in less developed country financial markets, in so far that they are not 
able to channel capital from savers to borrowers domestically. The financial 
intermediation activity is thus outsourced to developed countries. In particular, the 
global savings glut is believed to have led to housing bubbles in the US and other 
advanced economies due to low interest rates (Bernanke, 2005). This approach 
does not take into account the role of credit creation and cross-border financing 
flows (Disyata (2011), Liang (2012). 
 
(iii) The global banking glut emphasises the role of cross-border banking in the 
provision of easy credit. (Shin, 2012). Cross border banking and the fluctuating 
leverage of the global banks are the channels through which permissive financial 
conditions are transmitted globally. In particular, the gross capital flows into the 
US in the form of lending by European banks via the shadow banking system 
(through the purchase of mortgage-backed securities) may have played a 
significant role in influencing credit conditions in the US in the run up to the 
crisis.  
 
(iv) New mercantilism approaches (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, Garber, 
2008,Subramanian 2012). This view focuses on the export-led growth model as an 
explanation for the global pattern of current account deficits and surpluses. In 
particular, the export oriented development model undertaken by East Asian 
countries, including management of the exchange rate, has led to the creation of 
large current account surpluses in these countries and current account deficits in 
countries of their trading partners. 
 
(v) Excess global demand for safe assets and distortions in financial markets 
(Caballero, 2009). The less developed economies have been catching up while 
their financial system has remained underdeveloped. The demand for financial 
assets has led to excessive financial innovation in the developed economies. 
Additionally, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the less developed countries 
have started accumulating reserves to insulate themselves against the possibility of 
another crisis. (Caballero, 2009). 
 
(vi) The intertemporal approach (Engel, Rogers, 2006,Belke, Dreger, 2011) according 
to which the current account today is equal to the discounted value of future 
expected output or net wealth. 
 
In addition to the explanations mentioned above, the literature discusses also specific 
factors that may contribute to the existing imbalances within Europe (although the current 
account of Europe as a whole remains balanced, there are divergences between individual 
countries (Aizenman (2011), Gros (2012), Schnabl, Freitag (2011)):  
  
(i) Financial integration and the catching up process (Lane 2006,2008, Goeurdacir 
and Martin 2009, Dreger 2011). Following the creation of the Euro Area, the 
reduction in transaction costs and the elimination of country specific risk have 
generated capital flows between the richer and poorer countries contributing to the 
creation of imbalances.  
 
(ii) Intra euro competiveness differences (Dreger 2011, Chen, Milesi Ferretti and 
Tresse, 2012),  As a result of financial integration that has led to lower interest 
rates in some countries, domestic prices and unit labour costs have risen faster 
than productivity. Stronger real exchange rate has hampered export in the non-
tradable sector which has led to an external imbalance.  
 
This paper studies the impacts of various policy factors that shape the composition of world 
GDP and determine the scale of international imbalances. We consider policies that can 
reduce global imbalances such as exchange rate policy in China and fiscal policy in the US. 
We look at the effects of catching up in China and a corresponding decline in the saving rate.  
 
We also study the consequences of shifts in the oil price with the ensuing adjustment of trade 
between the oil exporting countries and the rest of the world. From the perspective of 
European imbalances we investigate the effects of several policies. These encompass internal 
devaluation, structural and fiscal policy adjustments, and deleveraging of the private and the 
public sectors.  
 
Global imbalances have been widening since the mid-1990s. They nearly halved in the 
aftermath of the global crisis and currently they are widening again. The main contributors to 
global imbalances are the US on the deficit side, and China, Japan and the oil exporting 
nations on the surplus side. The EU as a whole remains balanced, however, there are 
significant divergences between individual member states with countries such as Germany, 
Austria and the Netherlands running surpluses, and Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy running 
persistent deficits. Figure 1 shows the decomposition of current account positions over recent 
years and it highlights the scale of current account imbalances, their concentration across 
countries and their persistence over time. For details on recent current account developments 
in selected countries see Annex A.  
Figure 1. Bird’s eye view on global and European imbalances 1995-2011 
Bn USD              Global imbalances  
 
% of GDP            European imbalances 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates global trade patterns from the regional perspective. As of 2011 China ran 
a surplus with the US and the European Union, while it had a deficit with the oil exporting 
countries. The US had a trade deficit with all major economies. The oil exporting countries 
ran a surplus with the US and China, while they ran a deficit with the European Union. The 
European Union had a deficit with China and a surplus with the US and the oil exporting 
countries.  
 
Figure 2. Current accounts – regional perspective - in per cent of the key world players’ GDP; as of 2011 
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The intra- and extra-EU trade is presented in figure 3. About 60 per cent of European trade is 
intra-EU. The intra-/extra-EU composition of trade varies across countries with about 60 per 
cent of German exports and imports going to and coming from other EU countries, and about 
80 per cent of Dutch exports and about 45 per cent of imports being with partners from the 
EU. 
 
Figure 3. Intra- and extra-EU trade, as of 2011 
 
 
Methodology 
 
To assess the effects of the adjustment to global imbalances we conduct a series of 
macroeconomic simulations and look at the macroeconomic effects of the unwinding of 
global imbalances for the US, China, oil exporting countries, and the EU and its individual 
member states in particular.   
 
The analysis is undertaken using the National Institute’s global macroeconomic model 
NIGEM. NIGEM is a large-scale quarterly macroeconomic model of the world economy. 
Most OECD countries are modelled separately, and the rest of the world is modelled through 
regional blocks - compare table 1. By incorporating the models for individual countries into 
the global context, we ensure that the unwinding of global imbalances has, via links between 
countries, an impact on all economies. Economies are linked through trade, competitiveness 
and financial markets. The model allows us to identify and assess the relative strength of the 
transmission channels that the global rebalancing would involve, with global shocks 
spreading through the real (foreign trade, GDP, labour markets, prices) and the financial 
(exchange rates, interest rates) sectors of the economy. A brief description of the model is 
attached in annex B. 
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Table 1. Country coverage  
EU27-EMU 
EU27-
nonEMU Other countries Regions 
Austria 
Belgium 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Bulgaria 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Sweden 
UK 
Australia 
Canada 
China 
Hong Kong 
India 
Japan 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Russia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
US 
Africa 
Asia - Far East 
Commonwealth 
and Independent 
States 
Developing 
Europe 
Latin America 
Middle East (oil 
exporting 
countries) 
 
We conduct a series of scenarios by which global and European imbalances adjustment may 
take place. Our global scenarios analyse four different paths for adjustment of global 
imbalances. We start with two scenarios investigating the effects of two main factors which 
may affect the evolution of global imbalances: unbalanced growth models in emerging 
market economies and the high level of indebtedness in the advanced economies. We then 
examine the role of the oil exporting countries. Finally, we look at a coordinated policy 
scenario that would lead to a gradual and controlled reduction of global imbalances.  
 
To study the intra Euro Area imbalances, we design four scenarios that address the issue of 
differences in price and non-price competitiveness within the Euro Area. In particular we 
investigate the effects of internal devaluation in Southern Europe, the impacts of increased 
technology competitiveness and structural reforms in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece and 
the effects of deleveraging in the private and public sectors in the four most indebted 
Southern European countries. 
 
Our global scenarios are specified as follows: 
 
G1. Chinese scenario  
 
In this scenario imbalances are reduced gradually through adjustments in the saving rate and 
the exchange rate policy in China. China’s saving rate declines, the renminbi gradually 
appreciates and China’s current account surplus declines.  
 
G2. US scenario  
 
In this scenario imbalances are reduced gradually. The US adjusts its fiscal policy, private 
saving rebuilds (via entailing private sector deleveraging), demand in the US declines and the 
US current account deficit declines. 
 
G3. Oil exporting countries scenario 
 
In this scenario we look at the impact of changes in oil prices and the higher spending of oil 
exporting countries aimed at diversifying the sources of growth of their economies.  
G4. Coordinated Transpacific Policy Action scenario 
 
In this scenario global imbalances are reduced gradually as a result of a coordinated policy 
action on both sides of the Pacific. The US reduces its budget deficit, demand in the US 
decreases, and the exchange rate depreciates. China allows for a faster appreciation of the 
renminbi.  
 
The intra Euro Area adjustment scenarios encompass the following ones: 
 
E1. Internal devaluation in Southern Europe 
 
This scenario looks at effects of increased price competitiveness in Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Greece which is effected through a cut in wages 
 
E2. Technology competitiveness shock/structural reforms in Southern Europe 
 
We assume that the level of technological progress increases which is accompanied by a 
change in the structure of trade. Higher technological progress would allow the Southern 
European countries to export more.  
 
E3. Deleveraging of the private sector in Southern Europe 
  
This scenario assumes that the level of private sector indebtedness of the Southern European 
countries goes down. 
 
E4. Deleveraging of the public sector in Southern Europe 
 
We assume that the scale of the public sector indebtedness as measured by debt to GDP ratio 
goes down. 
 
We look at the effects of the above shocks on key macroeconomic variables such as current 
account balances, GDP growth and inflation developments, as well as other variables.  
 
Global scenarios 
Scenario G1: Chinese scenario  
 
The Chinese exchange rate misalignment has been viewed as one of the sources of global 
imbalances. China has a history of interventions in the foreign exchange market aimed at 
supporting its export-led growth and contributing to large current account surpluses. The 
exchange rate alone does not explain the high current account surplus of China (Cordon, 
2009), and the other determinant of the high Chinese current account surplus is the high 
saving rate. There is a relatively large body of literature that argues that the global saving glut 
has contributed to the recent crisis (Bernanke, 2005, Wolf, 2008). The Chinese saving rate is 
considered to be one of the highest by international and historical standards.  
 
Precautionary savings in China could decline and create sufficient momentum for household 
consumption in response to various policies enacted by the government. Since the crisis the 
government has focused its policy efforts in the areas that may accelerate the transformation 
of the Chinese economic model, improve the standard of living and raise domestic 
consumption (Ahuja et al. (2011)). These policies encompass inter alia the construction of 
new health facilities (especially in rural areas), launching a new government health insurance 
programme and expanding the existing government pension scheme to cover the urban 
unemployed and making pensions more portable within China. The new Five Year Plan 
launched in 2011 envisages constructing 36 million low income housing units by 2016. This 
has the potential to ease the budget constraints of low income groups and release savings 
toward financing home purchases. Although both initiatives – improving the social safety net 
and increasing the provision of social housing – are likely to have long lags, they can lead to 
a decline in precautionary savings in the future.  
 
In light of the above, our Chinese scenario allows for an appreciation of the Chinese 
currency, by 5 per cent. We also allow for a decrease in the saving rate. We assume that the 
domestic demand increases by 1 per cent.  
 
Figure 4. Chinese scenario results  
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Figure 4 illustrates the results. Stronger renminbi and stronger domestic demand result in the 
lower current account in China. Current accounts in the US and the Euro Area improve 
slightly, the Euro Area being marginally more responsive. Stronger renminbi also results in a 
temporary decline in the Chinese GDP. Over the long run GDP in China increases which 
results from the lower saving rate. GDP in the Euro Area and the US increases. 
 
Changes to the Chinese exchange rate policy and the releasing of domestic savings have an 
impact on the domestic economy. In response to lower GDP the unemployment rate goes up. 
The stronger exchange rate translates into lower prices. The pass through effect is about 0.5 
per cent (this includes the effects of the lower saving rate, however, the relative weight of this 
component is relatively small).  
 
Change to the Chinese exchange rate and the saving rate result in an increase in the world 
GDP and the world trade. The world output increases by about 0.25 per cent and the world 
trade goes up by about 0.5 per cent. The change in the world trade is mainly due to an 
increase in Chinese imports and exports. China’s share in global exports increases by slightly 
less than 1 percentage point, her share in world imports goes up by slightly more than 1 
percentage point. 
 
Figure 5 shows the impact of the Chinese adjustment on selected Euro Area economies. The 
pattern of current account responses is similar across countries and it corresponds to the J 
curve. A devalued currency (stronger renminbi implies weaker euro) means that imports are 
more expensive. Assuming that the volumes of imports and exports immediately change 
little, this leads to a worsening of the current account. Over time the volume of exports rises, 
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as the price competitiveness of exports improves and the volume of imports decreases, as 
imports become more costly to domestic buyers. The speed and magnitude of the adjustment 
in current accounts across individual members of the Euro Area vary and depend on their 
exposure to China, and structural features of their economies, such as price and demand 
elasticities of trade.  
 
Figure 5. Chinese scenario - European results 
  
 
Scenario G2: US Scenario 
While there is a discussion as for to what extent the Chinese renminbi is misaligned, there 
seems to be a broad agreement that the US dollar is not greatly misaligned (there is also less 
space for a potential misalignment as the exchange rate of the US dollar is shaped by the 
markets). Thus, it can be argued that the US external imbalance is driven by shortfalls of 
savings relative to investment, rather than an overvalued exchange rate (Yoshitomi et al., 
2007).  
 
According to the twin deficit theory an increase in the government consumption or 
investment demand for tradable goods, or a fiscal expansion in general, will be reflected in a 
larger current account deficit. The strength of this relationship depends on several factors 
such as: the type of consumers (myopic or Ricardian), the role of relative prices, the response 
of country risk premia, the degree of economic and financial openness, the size of the output 
gap (Abbas et al (2010)).  
 
It should be noted that there can be a number of explanations of the low level of savings in 
the US (including the role of net inflows of foreign savings that reduced the US long term 
real interest rates and inflated asset prices (Lian, 2012), and increased demand for riskless 
assets from countries with current account surpluses (Bernanke (2005), Acharya, Schnabl 
(2010)). However, it seems that given the size of the US deficit, increasing national saving 
would also involve fiscal consolidation.  
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Our US scenario assumes a permanent reduction in the domestic demand, via a permanent 
reduction in government consumption. We assume that the government consumption 
decreases by 1 per cent of GDP.  
 
The literature suggests that a 1 percentage point fiscal consolidation corresponds to an 
improvement in the current account by 0.1–0.4 percentage points (compare for example IMF 
results (Abbas et al. (2010)). Our results, as shown in figure 6, suggest the US current 
account improves by about 0.3 percentage point, in line with the literature. Current accounts 
of China and the Euro Area worsen. China remains less sensitive to changes in the American 
demand than the Euro Area. This results from the relatively rigid renminbi.  
 
Figure 6. US scenario results 
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Lower government spending in the US results in lower GDP in the US. It also leads to a 
temporary decrease in GDP in China and the Euro Area. Unemployment in the US goes up in 
the short run. The weaker labour market and a bigger output gap exert deflationary pressures 
on prices. 
  
The world output declines by about 0.3 per cent. The world trade goes down as well. The US 
imports less, while the shares of China and Germany in total world imports increase. Export 
shares of the main global players change rather negligibly.  
 
Figure 7 shows the impact of changes in the US demand on selected members of the Euro 
Area. Current accounts of all European countries worsen. The pattern or responses remains 
similar across countries. Differences reflect the scale of exposure of individual economies to 
the US, as well as different price and demand elasticities of trade. 
 
Figure 7. US scenario - European results 
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Scenario G3: Oil exporting countries scenario 
The current account of oil exporting countries has been tracking closely the oil price path 
since the oil price started to rise at the beginning of 2000. The rising price of oil has 
contributed to an increase in the current account deficit of the oil consuming economies, such 
as the US, and it has generated current account surpluses in oil exporters. In effect the oil 
exporters has replaced Asia as a region with the highest current account surplus (Beck, Kamp 
(2012)).  
This scenario assumes a permanent rise in the oil price by 10 USD per barrel. We assume that 
thanks to the increased revenues from oil exports, oil exporting countries have capacities to 
invest more, which enhances their growth potential by about 0.5 per cent. The higher 
potential growth enables them to diversify the sources of their growth which, in effect, may 
contribute to the rebalancing of the world economy.  
Higher oil prices imply higher costs for both investors and households in oil importing 
countries. This supply constraint translates into lower GDP and higher inflation. From the 
perspective of oil producers higher oil prices positively impact their budget balance. We 
assume that the oil producers invest some of the revenues which boosts their GDP. The 
impact on both producers and importers is shown below in figure 8. Current accounts in 
China, the US and the Euro Area worsen, while current accounts in the Middle East countries 
improve. 
However, higher oil prices, and higher potential growth in the oil exporting countries 
contribute to greater imbalances. The oil exporting countries export more oil, and the increase 
in potential output allows them export more other products. In effect, their current account 
balance with the rest of the world goes up. A partial adjustment of global imbalances would 
take place, if oil prices went down.  
 
Figure 8. Oil exporting countries scenario - results 
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Scenario G4: Transpacific Policy Coordination 
This scenario envisages that the biggest contributors to global imbalances (and two of the 
three biggest world players): China and the US adjust their policies simultaneously. The scale 
of policy shocks is relatively limited, and the scenario does not envisage any adjustments to 
deep parameters (such as the rate of population growth, the elasticity of substitution or 
changes in preferences). This makes this scenario realistic and relatively easy to implement: 
policy changes are not radical. We assume a 5 per cent realignment of the Chinese renminbi 
and a 1 percentage point reduction in the US deficit. The scenario does not assume any 
changes to the behaviour of households and enterprises.  
 
Figure 9 shows the response of key macroeconomic variables in the US, China and the Euro 
Area to the coordinated action of the Chinese and American authorities aimed at reducing the 
scale of global imbalances. We decompose the final impacts into those driven by the Chinese 
shock and those that are attributable to changes in the US fiscal policy. 
 
GDP in the US and China declines, with the maximum effect close to 1 per cent. The world 
output and the world trade go down in the short to medium run.  
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Figure 9. Transpacific Policy Coordination scenario – results  
  
  
The role of policy changes at home is very significant for the domestic economy. In response 
to the stronger exchange rate and tighter fiscal policy the unemployment rate in both 
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countries increases (see figure 10). Both countries also record lower inflation. The current 
account in the US improves, while the Chinese one decreases in the long run. The current 
account of the Euro Area as a whole deteriorates which predominantly results from fewer 
export opportunities to the US.  
 
Figure 10. Transpacific Policy Coordination scenario - results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 shows the response of current accounts in individual members of the Euro Area. 
The adjustment of the US fiscal policy has a negative effect on current accounts in all Euro 
Area countries. The impact of the Chinese exchange rate misalignment is smaller. Positive 
effects materialise quicker in the countries with higher price elasticity of exports (such as 
Spain or Italy).  
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Figure 11. . Transpacific Policy Coordination scenario – European results 
  
  
 
 
European scenarios 
 
To analyse the impacts of potential adjustments within the Euro Area we conduct four 
simulations. The simulations are designed to provide an assessment of the effects of increased 
competitiveness of the Southern European countries: Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. We 
consider four different policies: (i) internal devaluation, through wages, in Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and Greece aimed at improving their price competitiveness; (ii) a technological 
progress shock aimed at improving technological competitiveness and a change in the 
structure of Spain’s, Italy’s, Portugal’s and Greece’s trade, (iii) private sector deleveraging in 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, and (iv) public sector deleveraging in Spain, Italy, Portugal 
and Greece.  
 
Scenario E1: Internal devaluation in Southern Europe 
The countries in the Euro Area do not have the option of currency devaluation to increase 
their competitiveness, and all potential adjustment needs to be achieved by internal 
devaluation that is a reduction in nominal prices, wages and asset values. The experiences of 
the Baltic states show that internal devaluation is possible and may bring economies back on 
track. The internal devaluation achieves the same real price change as a currency devaluation 
but internally rather than externally. The internal devaluation may be regarded as more costly 
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
pp
  d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 b
as
el
in
e 
Current account in Germany 
Renminbi apreciation US deficit reduction
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
pp
  d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 b
as
el
in
e 
Current account in the Netherlands 
Renminbi apreciation US deficit reduction
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0,2
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
pp
  d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 b
as
el
in
e 
Current account in Spain 
Renminbi apreciation US deficit reduction
-0,3
-0,2
-0,1
0
0,1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
pp
  d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 b
as
el
in
e 
Current account in Italy 
Renminbi apreciation US deficit reduction
as the external devaluation (Ruparel (2012)) as it involves changing many prices rather than 
one exchange rate (implying higher menu costs). As wages tend to be sticky downwards, the 
process of internal devaluation may be accompanied by higher unemployment. The internal 
devaluation may also imply a higher number of household defaults, adding to the short run 
stress. 
Our scenario assumes a 1 per cent cut in wages in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. To 
capture the short run costs of the adjustment as described above, we allow for a temporary 
increase in (investment) risk premium (by 0.25 percentage point). This allows us to introduce 
the effects of potentially higher unemployment in the short run, as well as potential defaults 
of households, and the cost of changing menu for firms.  The size of the investment premium 
shock is difficult to calibrate. While we realise that the size of the shock could be calibrated 
differently, it seems that in terms of the qualitative adjustment the pattern of responses would 
be similar. In the absence of the investment premium shock, the short term costs of the 
adjustment would be much lower. Our scenario can thus be interpreted as providing an upper 
bound of the short term costs associated with internal devaluations. 
 
 Figure 12. Internal devaluation - results 
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In response to an internal devaluation shock achieved through a cut in wages and a temporary 
increase in investment premium, GDP falls initially for a couple of quarters. The drop results 
from higher user cost of capital. Following a positive response of the labour market to lower 
wages, GDP gradually recovers. In the long run, the better situation on the labour market 
translates into higher GDP of the Southern European countries. The permanent cut in wages 
leaves the unemployment rate below the baseline level permanently. The lower wages also 
mean less pressure on prices. In the short run the wage effect on prices is reinforced by the 
lower output gap. Current accounts of the four Southern European countries improve 
significantly in the short to medium run. This results from a drop in their imports rather than 
an increase in exports. Spill-over effects for other countries in the Euro Area are relatively 
limited and the current account of the Euro Area as a whole improves slightly. Spill over 
effects for the non-EU countries, and China and the US in particular, are practically 
negligible. 
  
Scenario E2: Technological competitiveness shock and structural reforms 
In the era of globalisation moving up in the value added chain improves the current account. 
The statistical evidence would suggest that countries with higher spending on R&D run 
current account surpluses or lower current account deficits than the countries with low levels 
of R&D expenditures (see Annex C). The higher R&D may translate into higher exports, 
including more expensive high tech exports.  
 
This scenario assumes that an increase in the technological competitiveness of the four 
Southern European countries may induce a change in the structure in their exports (towards 
high tech goods) and improve their current accounts. We shock the level of technological 
progress in the Southern European countries by 1 per cent per annum over the period of 5 
years. In addition, we assume that following the increase in technological competitiveness, 
the structure of trade changes and there are more goods exported and fewer goods imported. 
We change the structure of trade by reducing imports via a reduction in government 
consumption by 1 per cent of GDP.  
 
The faster technological progress results in higher GDP in the long run as potential output 
increases. There are costs in the short run, which result from the structural policy of 
adjustment in the trade structure. These manifest through lower GDP and higher 
unemployment.  
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Figure 13. Technological competitiveness shock - results 
  
  
  
 
Current accounts in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece improve. Through an array of trade 
linkages in Europe, current accounts in neighbouring countries worsen slightly. The current 
account of the Euro Area as a whole improves, by about 0.1 percentage point. Current 
accounts of China and the US worsen slightly. The US is marginally more responsive than 
China.  
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Scenario E3: Private sector deleveraging 
The currently observed process of deleveraging in the private and public sectors reflects the 
gradual unwinding of imbalances accumulated in the run up to the crisis and financed by 
excessive credit (sometimes accompanied by asset price bubbles in the private sector), and 
the lack of fiscal discipline in the public sector. In the next two scenarios we look at the 
effects of an increase in the savings rate of the private sector, and a decrease in expenditures 
of the public sector. 
  
Our private sector deleveraging scenario assumes an increase in the saving rate of households 
in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece by about 0.5 percentage point. The size of shock could be 
calibrated differently, with a gradual increase in the saving rate of households.  In the light of 
the recent financial crisis, which was an abrupt event, this scenario assumes that the 
adjustment in the household sector can be relatively quick. Should the adjustment be slower, 
the short term GDP impacts would be milder. This scenario can be interpreted in terms of 
providing an upper bound in terms of the short term GDP costs. 
 
The increased rate of savings corresponds to lower consumption and GDP in the Southern 
European countries. In the short run GDP decreases and the rate of unemployment increases 
(figure 14). The impact on GDP in other countries of the Euro Area is negligible.   
 
Figure 14. Private sector deleveraging – results  
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Current accounts in the Southern European countries improve, while the current accounts in 
the other members of the Euro Area worsen slightly. The unwinding of intra-European 
imbalances takes place through import rather than export adjustments. Changes in the 
Chinese and US current accounts are negative, and practically negligible. The US is 
marginally more responsive. 
 
Scenario E4: Public sector deleveraging 
Our public deleveraging scenario assumes that the level of debt in the Southern European 
countries goes down by about 10 percentage points within the next 8 years. This is achieved 
through a cut in government spending. To achieve a 10 percentage point reduction in debt 
within the next 8 years, we assume that the government spending is reduced by about 2 per 
cent of GDP. We apply the same size of shock to all indebted countries in Southern Europe: 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. 
 
Figure 15. Private sector deleveraging – results  
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The adjustment of fiscal policy aimed at a reduction of public debt corresponds to lower GDP 
in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece (see figure 15). The Greek effect is biggest which may 
result from a lower degree of Greece’s openness. The larger is the share of imports in a 
country’s GDP, the smaller the fiscal multiplier as the bigger the leakage to the imports and 
the less effective is the fiscal policy (Barrell, Fic, Liadze (2009)). 
 
The unemployment rate in all four countries increases and inflation goes down.  
 
Current accounts of the Southern European countries improve. This is achieved through 
imports rather than exports. The negative response of current accounts of other members of 
the Euro Area is small, and the current account of the Euro Area as a whole improves 
slightly. Current accounts of China and the US worsen slightly, and the US is slightly more 
responsive.  
 
Scenario comparison 
We have considered 4 policies through which adjustment of intra-European imbalances may 
take place:  
 
(i) internal devaluation,  
 
(ii) technological/structural reforms,  
-0,5
0
0,5
1
0 2 5 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32
pp
  d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 b
as
el
in
e 
Unemployment in Southern 
Europe 
Spain Italy
Portugal Greece
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
0 2 5 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32
pp
  d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 b
as
el
in
e 
Inflation in Southern Europe 
Spain Italy
Portugal Greece
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0 2 5 8 11 14 17 20 23 26 29 32
pp
  d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 b
as
el
in
e 
Current accounts in the Euro Area, 
US, and China 
Euro Area China US
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
ex
po
rt
s
im
po
rt
s
ex
po
rt
s
im
po
rt
s
ex
po
rt
s
im
po
rt
s
ex
po
rt
s
im
po
rt
s
Spain Italy Germany France
Export and import shares (pp 
deviation from baseline) 
Years 1-2 Years 3-4 Years 5-6
(iii) private sector deleveraging, and 
 
(iv) public sector deleveraging 
 
 
Table 2 shows the response of current accounts in the Southern European countries, and 
selected countries of the Euro Area under each of the four scenarios. We show deviations 
from baseline, in absolute terms, expressed in percentage points, over an 8 year period. 
 
Table 2. Scenario comparison – current account responses (deviations from baseline in percentage points, 
8 year average) 
 
CBR 
response 
(average 
over 8 yrs) 
Internal devaluation Technology 
competitiveness 
shock/structural 
reforms  
Private sector 
deleveraging 
Public sector 
deleveraging 
  
1 per cent cut in wages, 
0.25 pp increase in risk 
premium 
Technological progress 
shock – 5 per cent 
(spread over 5 years); 
change in the structure 
of trade via reduction in 
gov cons by 1 per cent  
Increase in the saving 
rate by about 0.5 
percentage point 
Reduction in the 
government debt ratio 
by about 10 per cent of 
GDP in the long run  
Spain 0.16 0.26 0.35 1.46 
Italy 0.17 0.49 0.35 1.49 
Portugal 0.06 0.36 0.32 1.15 
Greece 0.08 0.54 0.39 1.70 
Germany -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.20 
France -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 
Netherlands -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.15 
      
 
  
Euro Area 0.03 0.32 0.08 0.34 
US -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.10 
China -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 
 
 
Due to the large scale of intra-trade within the EU, policies aimed at reducing current account 
deficits in certain countries result in reduced surpluses in other members of the Euro Area. 
Spillover effects for non-EU countries, China and the US, are very small and China is usually 
less responsive than the US. 
 
We also study the effects on GDP. We look at the deviation from baseline, in per cent – see 
table 3 – taking the average deviation of an 8 year period. In terms of the effects on GDP, 
different policies have different costs.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Scenario comparison – GDP responses (deviations from baseline in per cent, 8 year average) 
GDP 
response 
(average 
over 8 yrs) 
Internal 
devaluation* 
Technology 
competitiveness 
shock/structural 
reforms  
Private sector 
deleveraging 
Public sector 
deleveraging 
  
1 per cent cut in wages, 
0.25 pp increase in risk 
premium 
Technological progress 
shock – 5 per cent 
(spread over 5 years); 
change in the structure 
of trade via reduction in 
gov cons by 1 per cent  
Increase in the saving 
rate by about 0.5 
percentage point 
Reduction in the 
government debt ratio 
by about 10 per cent of 
GDP in the long run  
Spain 0.07 1.17 -0.28 -1.08 
Italy -0.12 0.77 -0.30 -1.11 
Portugal 0.05 0.02 -0.49 -1.81 
Greece 0.13 0.02 -0.47 -2.11 
Germany 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.09 
France 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.05 
Netherlands 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.08 
* Negative effects concentrated in the short run, positive effects materialising in the long run. It takes Italy 
longer (than other countries) to achieve GDP levels that exceed the baseline (compare figure 12).  
 
 
To be able to compare the four policies presented above, we calibrate the size of the initial 
shock under each of the four scenarios that would be required to reduce current account 
deficits in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece by 1 percentage point (on average, over an 8 
year period). Table 4 shows our calibrated estimation that corresponds to a 1 percentage point 
reduction in current account (averaged across four countries, and over an 8 year period). 
 
 
Table 4. Calibration 
Policy  Internal devaluation Technology 
competitiveness 
shock/structural 
reforms  
Private sector 
deleveraging 
Public sector 
deleveraging 
Shock in 
Spain, Italy, Portugal 
and 
Greece 
Cut in wages Technological progress 
shock; change in the 
structure of trade via 
reduction in gov cons  
Increase in the saving 
rate  
Reduction in the 
government debt ratio  
Current account 
balance (deficit 
reduction)  
1 percentage point  1 percentage point  1 percentage point  1 percentage point  
The size of the 
required shock   
The size of shock 
should vary across 
countries with Greece 
and Portugal requiring 
bigger adjustments  
than Italy and Spain.  
A 2 per cent per annum 
increase in technical 
progress, a 2 per cent 
change in government 
consumption  
1.3 percentage point 
shock to the saving rate  
At least 7 percentage 
points reduction in 
public debt within the 
next 8 years 
 
All policies have the potential to reduce the scale of imbalances in Europe. However, 
different policies have different costs. They also come with different lags.  
A mix of policies is probably a better solution than any of the above policies implemented in 
isolation. The policies should be treated as complements rather than substitutes. Structural 
policies and reforms usually have costs, however, a proper calibration and appropriate 
sequencing of different measures may support a growth-friendly reduction of intra European 
imbalances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper was to investigate the macroeconomic implications of the 
unwinding of global imbalances for the biggest world players: the US, China, oil exporting 
countries and the European Union, with a particular focus on Euro Area members. We have 
also looked at the implications of adjustment within the Euro Area. 
 
Global imbalances may be adjusted either through adjustment policies in China or the US. 
The adjustment on the Chinese side results in a lower current account in China and higher 
current accounts in the US and the Euro Area. The adjustment on the US side results in a 
higher current account in the US and lower current accounts in China and the Euro Area.  
 
From the European perspective, adjustments in China result in an improvement of current 
accounts in all Euro Area countries, while adjustments in the US result in a deterioration of 
current accounts across the Euro Area. In the case of the US adjustment, the deterioration of 
the current account in the Euro Area is larger than in China which results from the fact that 
China is less responsive to external shocks due to, inter alia, a relatively rigid exchange rate. 
 
Intra-European imbalances may be adjusted through various policies. This paper looks at 
possible adjustments through internal devaluation, technological competitiveness 
shock/structural reforms and deleveraging of the private and public sectors in Southern 
Europe. There is probably no silver bullet solution, and an appropriately calibrated mix of 
policies may be required. The adjustment on the side of the Southern European countries 
results in an improved current account for the Euro Area as a whole.  
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Annex A. Current account decompositions 
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Annex B. A brief description of NIGEM 
For a macroeconometric model to be useful for policy analyses, particular attention must be 
paid to its long-term equilibrium properties. At the same time, we need to ensure that short-
term dynamic properties and underlying estimated properties are consistent with data and 
well-determined. As far as possible the same long run theoretical structure of NiGEM has 
been adopted for each of the major industrial countries, except where clear institutional or 
other factors prevent this. As a result, variations in the properties of each country model 
reflect genuine differences in data ratios and estimated parameters, rather than different 
theoretical approaches. 
 
Production and price setting 
 
The major country models rely on an underlying constant-returns-to-scale CES production 
function with labour-augmenting technical progress.  
 
( )[ ] ρρλργ /1))(1( −−− −+= tLesKsQ       (1) 
 
where Q is real output, K is the total capital stock, L is total hours worked and t is an index of 
labour-augmenting technical progress. This constitutes the theoretical background for the 
specifications of the factor demand equations, forms the basis for unit total costs and provides 
a measure of capacity utilization, which then feed into the price system. The elasticity of 
substitution is estimated from the labour demand equation, and in general it is around 0.5. 
Demand for labour and capital are determined by profit maximisation of firms, implying that 
the long-run labour-output ratio depends on real wage costs and technical progress, while the 
long-run capital output ratio depends on the real user cost of capital. 
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where w/p is the real wage and c/p is the real user cost of capital. The user cost of capital is 
influenced by corporate taxes and depreciation and is a weighted average of the cost of equity 
finance and the margin adjusted long real rate, with weights that vary with the size of equity 
markets as compared to the private sector capital stock. Business investment is determined by 
the error correction based relationship between actual and equilibrium capital stocks. 
Government investment depends upon trend output and the real interest rate in the long run. 
Prices are determined as a constant mark-up over marginal costs in the long term.  
 
Labour market 
 
NiGEM assumes employers have a right to manage. Hence the bargain in the labour market is 
over the real wage. Real wages, therefore, depend on the level of trend labour productivity as 
well as the rate of unemployment. Labour markets embody rational expectations and wage 
bargainers use model consistent expectations. The dynamics of wage-setting depend upon the 
error correction term in the equation, the split between lagged inflation and forward inflation, 
and the impact of unemployment on the wage bargain.  There is no explicit equation for 
sustainable employment in the model, but as the wage and price system is complete the 
model delivers equilibrium levels of employment and unemployment. An estimate of the 
NAIRU can be obtained by substituting the mark-up adjusted unit total cost equation into the 
wage equation and solving for the unemployment rate. Labour supply is determined by 
demographics, migration and the participation rate.  
 
Consumption, personal income and wealth 
 
Consumption decisions depend on real disposable income and real wealth in the long run, and 
follow the pattern discussed in Barrell and Davis (2007). Total wealth is composed of 
financial and tangible (housing) wealth where the latter data is available. 
 
           (4) 
 
where C is real consumption, RPDI is real personal disposable income, RFN is real net 
financial wealth and RTW is real tangible wealth. The dynamics of adjustment to the long run 
are largely data based, and differ between countries to take account of differences in the 
relative importance of types of wealth and of liquidity constraints.  
 
Financial markets 
 
We generally assume that exchange rates are forward looking, and ‘jump’ when there is 
news. The size of the jump depends on the expected future path of interest rates and risk 
premia, solving an uncovered interest parity condition, and these, in turn, are determined by 
policy rules adopted by monetary authorities: 
 
           (5) 
 
where RX is the exchange rate, rh is the home interest rate set in line with a policy rule, ra is 
the interest rate abroad and rprx is the risk premium. We assume that bond and equity 
markets are forward looking, and long-term interest rates are a forward convolution of 
expected short-term interest rates. Forward looking equity prices are determined by the 
discounted present value of expected profits.  
 
Public sector  
 
Each country has a set of equations for the public sector. Direct and indirect taxes depend 
upon their respective tax bases and on the tax rate. Government spending on current goods 
and services and investment spending depend in part on current plans, and by default rise 
with trend output. Transfer payments depend upon unemployment and the dependency ratio 
as well as on policy. Government interest payments are determined by a perpetual inventory 
model based on the flow deficit and the stock of debt, with the appropriate structure of short 
and long-term interest payments on the debt stock. Budget deficits are kept within bounds in 
the longer term (Barrell and Sefton, 1997) through a targeted adjustment on income tax rates. 
  
External trade 
 
International linkages come from patterns of trade, the influence of trade prices on domestic 
price, the impacts of exchange rates and patterns of asset holding and associated income 
flows. The volumes of exports and imports of goods and services are determined by foreign 
or domestic demand, respectively, and by competitiveness as measured by relative prices or 
costs. The estimated relationships also include measures to capture globalization, European 
)1)](1/()1)[(1()( rprxrarhtRXtRX ++++=
)ln()1()ln()ln( RTWRFNRPDIC +−++= ββα
integration and sector-specific developments. Exporters are assumed to compete against 
others who export to the same market and domestic producers via relative prices; demand is 
given by a share of imports in the markets to which the country has previously exported. 
Imports depend on import prices relative to domestic prices and on domestic total final 
expenditure. As exports depend on imports, they will rise together in the model. The overall 
current balance depends upon the trade balance and net property income from abroad, 
comprising flows of income on gross foreign assets and outgoings on gross foreign liabilities. 
Gross national product is GDP plus net factor income from foreigners. 
 
Annex C. R&D expenditures and current accounts 
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